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Foreword
After years of growth in many forms of regulation, there is now 
considerable interest in evaluating the extent and effectiveness of reg­
ulation. Frequently there is question whether the benefits of a particular 
program exceed its costs.
In a free market, individuals have a choice whether or not to buy a 
particular item; they can make their own evaluations of the costs and 
benefits of alternatives. The Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities 
found that because of various regulatory requirements for independent 
audits and professional standards for the performance of audits, the 
extent of audit services is not determined in a free market; that is, 
individual users have a limited ability to balance the costs of an audit 
against its benefits. Therefore, it is essential that those who establish 
the requirements and standards consider the resulting costs and bene­
fits.
Cost-benefit analysis is a recently popular discipline, but its tech­
niques are still in the early stages of development. Attempts to 
measure costs and benefits of particular programs of regulation have 
not been notably successful. Attempts to relate cost-benefit analysis to 
audit services have been rare.
The Commission asked Professor Melvin F. Shakun to investigate 
the application of cost-benefit analysis to audit services. Professor 
Shakun’s study identifies a number of promising approaches for ana­
lyzing costs and benefits from the points of view of the economy as a 
whole, of the individual audit client, and of the auditor.
Although there is not presently available sufficient data to permit 
the application of these techniques, we hope that this study will en­
courage future research in this important area.
This is the third of four studies to be published from the back­
ground research for the Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities. The 
studies are not part of the Commission’s report, but the Commission 
believes they contain useful material that warrants wide distribution.
Publication does not necessarily constitute endorsement or approval 
by either the AICPA or the Commission. Authors of research studies 
are responsible for the content and recommendations.
Lee J. Seidler 
Deputy Chairman 
Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities
D. R. Carmichael 
Research Director 
Commission on Auditors’ 
Responsibilities
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Introduction
The role of the independent auditor and the need for auditing arise - 
from the potential conflict of interests between users of financial infor­
mation and its preparer.1 The benefits of auditing are thus associated 
with the benefits provided by financial information. By measuring such 
benefits in relation to the cost of auditing, a balance between the two 
elements can be struck: in this study we shall apply cost-benefit analy­
sis to the audit function.
In the allocation of resources in the economy, benefits of auditing 
may be measured by a reduction in the cost of accounting information 
errors. Such errors may result from fraud, clerical errors, inappropriate 
selection or application of accounting principles, including inadequate 
disclosure and failure to reasonably estimate the outcome of future 
events.2 As discussed below, errors in accounting data— earnings, 
sales, inventories, and so forth— can affect estimated return and risk, 
which can affect efficient resource allocation. Estimated risk is affected 
not only by actual errors but also by lack of confidence in accounting 
data. By increasing confidence and reducing errors, auditing reduces 
the associated cost of accounting information errors. However, in so 
doing, a cost is incurred.
Figure 1 shows the cost-of-information-errors curve decreasing with 
increased auditing, while the cost-of-auditing curve is increasing. If 
these two curves are added, we obtain the curve for the total cost of 
information errors and auditing.
1. See Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities, Report, Conclusions, and Recom­
mendations (New York: 1978), pp. 1-11. Hereinafter cited as CAR, Report.
2. Commission on Auditors’ Responsibilities (1975), p. 16.
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Figure 1 shows that with the cost (amount) of auditing (X), the total cost 
of information errors and auditing (Y) is minimized. This occurs at the 
point where the marginal increase in auditing cost equals the marginal 
decrease in information error cost. At this point, the cost of auditing is 
balanced against its benefits (reduction of information errors). Thus, no 
more nor less auditing should be done.
Underlying the cost-of-information-errors curve in figure 1 is a logi­
cal concept, illustrated below, which says that auditing leads to a re­
duction in information errors which, in turn, leads to a reduction in the 
cost of information errors in the allocation of resources in the economy.
Reduction Reduction in the cost
Auditing  in information   of information errors in
errors the allocation of resources
To elaborate on this concept graphically, we may think of a curve that 
relates greater information error reduction to greater auditing cost (fig­
ure 2).
In turn, using arguments from capital budgeting and portfolio theory 
(see the next two sections, following), information error reduction may 
be related to the cost of inefficient resource allocation as in figure 3, 
which shows the latter decreasing with information error reduction.
The reasoning underlying this curve is developed in the following 
section.
Figure 1
Auditing and information error costs
2
Information
Error
Reduction
Cost of Auditing
Figure 2
Information response to auditing
Cost of 
Inefficient 
Resource 
Allocation
Figure 3
Resource allocation response to information error reduction
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Earnings Errors and Inefficient 
Resource Allocation in 
Capital Budgeting
The problem faced by a firm in choosing investments is termed 
capital budgeting. If the percent returns on available investment oppor­
tunities (projects) are ranked in decreasing order, a rate-of-return-on- 
investment curve (r) may be drawn. Thus, r in figure 4 is a decreasing 
function of investment (I ). The marginal cost of capital (m) is defined as 
the cost of each additional dollar obtained for making capital outlays. 
In general, m tends to increase as investment increases, though re­
maining constant over an initial investment range.3
Figure 4
The capital budgeting decision process
In figure 4, the optimal investment level is Io, corresponding to point 0, 
where the supply and demand curves intersect. Thus, in capital budg­
eting the firm should invest in projects having a rate of return greater 
than r0.
As noted, the marginal cost of capital (m ) is the incremental cost of 
each additional investment dollar. Firms with high earnings will have
3. For a detailed discussion of r and m and the capital budgeting process, see 
Weston and Brigham, 1972, chaps. 7 and 11.
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their marginal-cost-of-capital curves shifted to the right. In other words, 
with higher retained earnings, lower marginal capital costs will be pos­
sible up to a higher level of new investment. (See example and figure 
5, below.) Further, firms with low earnings risk will be favored by the 
capital markets and will have lowered marginal-cost-of-capital curves. 
(See the section, “Auditing, Portfolio Theory, and Capital Budgeting.”) 
Thus, the marginal cost of capital as estimated by the firm is a 
function of net income over time, depending on both expected earn­
ings and risk.4 The effect of accounting errors on earnings is to shift 
the estimated marginal-cost-of-capital curve (m ) to one of the dotted 
curves in figure 4, so that an otherwise optimal investment schedule 
may not be achieved. Otherwise put, the optimal equilibrium point be­
tween supply and demand for capital is shifted from point 0 to point 1 
or 2. Thus, the effect of errors on earnings can result in inefficient capi­
tal investment by the firm. Auditing can reduce such errors, thereby re­
ducing the cost of inefficient resource allocation to the firm and to the 
national economy. (See the section “Auditing, Portfolio Theory, and 
Capital Budgeting.” )
For example, suppose unaudited figures give either of the dotted 
marginal-cost-of-capital curves in figure 4 with associated investment 
levels— rates of return (I1,r1) or (I2 , r 2). Further, suppose auditing results 
in the solid m curve and “optimal” values (I0,r0). Assume the numerical 
values given in table 1.
Table 1: Example of loss or opportunity cost associated with audited 
and unaudited accounting data
Investment Rate of
Accounting Level Return
Data (Millions of Dollars) (Percent)
Audited I0 = 40 r0 = 10
Unaudited I1 = 44 r1 = 8
Unaudited I2 = 36 r2 = 12
Loss or 
Opportunity Cost 
(Dollars)
None
40,000
40,000
Then point 1 represents an incremental investment of 4 million dollars 
on which there is an approximate average loss of 1 percent or $40,000. 
Point 2 has an opportunity cost of $40,000, representing lost return due 
to investing only 36 million instead of 40 million dollars. Consequently, 
from this point of view, it is worth up to $40,000 in auditing fees to de­
termine a “correct” marginal-cost-of-capital curve.
4. See Brigham and Gordon, 1968, equations (5) and (17), or Elton and Gruber, 1975, 
p. 152, equation (23). Also see Litzenberger and Rao, 1972.
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As a further illustration, assume that during a given year a company 
had total earnings of $59 million available for common stockholders, 
paid $27 million in dividends, and retained $32 million.5 Assume, fur­
ther, that to adhere to the same capital structure policy, the retained 
earnings should equal 77 percent of the net addition to capital, with 22 
percent being debt and 1 percent preferred stock. With $32 million in 
retained earnings, the total amount of new capital that can be obtained 
using debt, preferred stock, and internally generated equity is $32 mil­
lion ÷ .77 or $41.6 million. This $41.6 million would consist of $32 mil­
lion equity, $9.2 million debt, and $.4 million preferred stock, 
corresponding to the 77, 22, and 1 percent figures, respectively, for the 
capital structure given above. (See column (1), table 2.)
Table 2: Cost of capital using internally generated equity, debt, and 
preferred stock
(1)
Amount of 
Capital in 
Millions of 
Dollars 
(or Percentage)
Debt
Preferred stock 
Internal common 
equity
$ 9.2 
.4
(22%)
(1%)
(2)
Component
Cost
3.6%
7.5%
32.0 (77%) 
$41.6 (100%) 
3.56
10.0%
(3) = (1)x(2) 
Amount of Cost 
(or Percentage 
Product)
$ .33 (.0079)
.03 (.0007)
3.20 (.0770) 
$3.56 (.0856)
Marginal cost = average cost = 41.6 = 8.56 = 8.6%
Now assume the component costs for debt, preferred stock, and com­
mon equity shown in column (2), table 2. Then, as shown, the marginal 
cost of capital is 8.6 percent— up to $41.6 million of new capital.
Suppose that beyond $41.6 million, the company must sell new 
equity issues at a cost of 10.4%. The weighted marginal cost of capital 
for capital in excess of $41.6 million is calculated as 8.9 percent in ta­
ble 3.
Table 3: Cost of capital using new common stock
Debt
Preferred stock 
Common equity (new)
(1)
Proportion
22%
1%
77%
(2)
Component
Cost
3.6%
7.5%
10.4%
100%
(3) = (1)x(2) 
Product
.0079
.0007
.0801
.0887 or 8.9%
5. This Illustration is based on example given by Weston and Brigham, 1972, pp. 
318-324.
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Figure 5 shows the marginal-cost-of-capital curve (m) for this sim­
ple illustration (solid m curve).
(Millions of Dollars)
Figure 5
Marginal-cost-of-capital and rate-of-return curves
The marginal cost of capital is 8.6 percent until $41.6 million; then, it 
jumps to 8.9 percent.
Now suppose that due to accounting errors, the earnings are not 
$59 million but $53 million, as determined by an audit. With the com­
pany still paying $27 million in dividends (for example, the company 
may have already paid out this amount or it may wish to maintain a 
constant dividend), this leaves $26 million retained earnings. This 
means that the jump point from 8.6 to 8.9 percent in the marginal cost 
of capital occurs at $33.8 million (22/.77 = 33.8) instead of $41.6 mil­
lion— see dotted m curve in figure 5.6 If the rate-of-return-on-investment 
curve (r) is as shown in figure 5, then the optimal investment level is at 
$34 million (point 0) instead of $40 million (point 1). Thus, without audit­
ing there would be an incremental investment of $6 million at an aver­
age loss of .15% [(8.9— 8.6)/2 = .15] or a $9000 investment loss.
   
6. In addition to shifting the m curve to the left, there can be a misestimation in the 
  level of either segment of the curve as illustrated in figure 4, due to risk.
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Auditing, Portfolio Theory, and 
Capital Budgeting
Figure 4, as discussed above, deals with the capital budgeting de­
cision of the firm. It also illustrates the capital budgeting process for 
investors— the portfolio problem if there is no risk. Investors, in the ab­
sence of risk, would have a one-asset portfolio holding the asset which 
gives the highest return on investment (r). If available investor re­
sources exceeded the capacity of this highest return investment to ab­
sorb them, then allocations would be made on successively lower rate- 
of-return investments until point 0 had been reached.
In the real world, of course, risk exists, and portfolio theory deals 
with both expected return and risk of return. Accounting data (pre­
sumably improved by auditing) is used to estimate expected return 
and risk which provide informational inputs to portfolio models.7 Port­
folio theory is concerned with the question of how to efficiently diversify 
a portfolio of securities under conditions of risk given an investor’s pre­
ferred trade-offs between risk and return. Sharpe and Lintner extend 
portfolio theory to explain how the expected return of a security is re­
lated to risk.8 Their model is called the capital assets pricing model in 
which the expected return of a security is related to a defined systema­
tic risk.
The systematic risk for a security measures the extent to which the 
security’s return is subject to the variability of the market as a whole. 
From a portfolio viewpoint, systematic risk measures the contribution of 
a security to the total riskiness of the portfolio— that is, it measures the 
riskiness of the security. Other risk components (called “unsystematic") 
of each security tend to cancel out when securities are combined in a 
portfolio. The larger the systematic risk, the larger the risk premium re­
quired by investors over and above the expected return of a riskless 
security.
Systematic risks must be estimated from accounting data. Empirical 
findings suggest a relationship between accounting data reflecting firm 
characteristics— such as financial leverage and stability of production, 
sales, capital expenditures, earnings, and dividends— and systematic 
risk.9 Whatever portfolio model is used, an error analysis could develop 
the cost of inefficient portfolios due to information errors, against which 
the cost of auditing could be balanced (see figure 1).
The collective portfolio decisions of investors provide the costs of 
equity and debt funds which are used in firms’ and industries’ capital 
budgeting decision processes. The optimal investment level by the firm
7. See Lev, 1974, chap. 12.
8. Lev, 1974, chap. 12.
9. Lev, 1974, chap. 13.
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depends on the marginal cost of capital (figure 4). Firms having low 
risk and high earnings will have favorable marginal cost of capital 
curves which are lowered and shifted to the right. Firms having good 
investment opportunities will have their r curves shifted upwards and to 
the right (figure 4). Thus, firms having both favorable investment 
schedules and marginal costs of capital will have higher equilibrium in­
vestment levels I0 with these higher amounts being supplied by inves­
tor portfolio decisions favoring such firms. From the point of view of 
welfare economics, increased investment by such firms will increase 
gross national product.10
From an overall viewpoint the foregoing model traces the contribu­
tion of auditing to economic output. Thus, an analysis of the effect of 
information errors could in principle develop the cost of inefficient re­
source allocation as measured by loss in overall economic output. The 
cost of auditing to reduce information errors could be balanced against 
this loss (as in figure 1). Auditing of information for quarterly as well as 
annual reports could be considered. In principle, social as well as eco­
nomic goals could be included.11
One final point concerns the effects of auditing on the distribution 
of wealth. Assuming investors have diversified their portfolios, the 
effects of accounting errors on the distribution of wealth among inves­
tors tend to cancel out. Thus, auditing appears to have a more impor­
tant impact on allocation of resources rather than on distribution of 
wealth. However, one may pose the hypothesis that the percentage of 
the population who are investors in various countries increases with 
audit quality. This hypothesis has yet to be tested; if true, then one can 
say that good auditing is associated with broader participation in in­
vestments— a distributional effect.
Audit Adjustments and Auditing 
Fees
As discussed above, errors in accounting data— earnings, sales, in­
ventories, and so forth— can affect estimated expected return and risk, 
which can affect efficient resource allocation. One benefit of an audit is 
to deter undesirable behavior.12 Financial information that is to be au­
dited may be considerably more reliable than it would be if it were not 
to be audited. Thus, the audit adjustments actually made are a mini­
10. Investment behavior is also related to gross national product and national income 
by macroeconomic models (see Evans, 1969).
11. See the section of this book entitled “Auditing and Linear Programming” ; also 
Seidler and Seidler, 1975.
12. See, Report, pp. 1-11. Independent auditor.
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mum measure of the effect of an audit. Bearing this in mind, one way 
to characterize the effect of an audit is to determine the dollar amounts 
of audit adjustments. It is then of interest to relate adjustment amounts 
(for example, in net income) to auditing fees, keeping in mind differ­
ences in transaction volumes, total assets, and quality of internal con­
trol among various companies. We note that one way to estimate 
auditing’s deterrent effect mentioned above would be to compare audit 
adjustments on first-time audits (which may occur, for example, with 
acquisitions or companies going public) with subsequent audits. Fi­
nally, data relating auditing fees to company characteristics (such as 
size, complexity, and type of business) have also been analyzed using 
a regression modeling approach (see the Appendix).
Auditing and Linear Programming
Another approach for studying the effect of auditing on resource al­
location is via linear programming. Linear programming is a technique 
which provides a general approach to resource allocation decisions.
As a simple illustration of linear programming, consider a firm that 
wishes to allocate its production capacity (resource) to each of two 
products so as to maximize profits.13 We let x1 and x2 represent, re­
spectively, the number of units of product 1 and product 2 to be made 
per day. The unit profit margins on products 1 and 2 are $3 (thousand) 
and $5 (thousand), respectively. Therefore, the firm wishes to maximize 
profit, Z = 3x1 + 5x 2. Assume the production facility that can make ei­
ther of the two products is available eighteen hours per day, and that 
the number of production hours required per unit of product 1 is three 
hours and per unit of product 2 is two hours. Therefore, we have the 
restriction that 3x1 + 2x2 ≤ 18. Assume the sales potential for product 1 
is four units per day and for product 2 is six units per day. This gives 
rise to the constraints x1 ≤  4 and x2 ≤  6. Since x1 and x2 may not be 
negative (negative production is not possible), we also write x1 ≥  0 
and x2 >  0. Thus, the linear programming formulation is 
Maximize Z = 3x1+ 5x2 
subject to the constraints
x1 ≤  4  
x2 ≤  6
3x1 +  2 x 2 ≤  18 
x1 ≥  0, x2 ≥  0
13. Illustration from Hillier and Lieberman, 1967, chap. 5.
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Figure 6 shows the formulation.
Figure 6
Illustrative linear programming problem
Any point (x1,x2) in the region ABCDE is a feasible solution in that it 
satisfies the constraints. The point D (x1 = 2, x2 = 6) is the optimal 
solution in that it gives the largest profit Z = 36, while satisfying the 
constraints. Three other lines representing profits Z of 10, 20, and 45 
are also drawn. Note tha t Z = 3x1 + 5x2 = 45 is not feasible since this 
line does not intersect the feasible region ABCDE. Thus the optimal so­
lution of this linear programming problem is to produce x1 = 2 and x2 
= 6 units of product 1 and 2, respectively, giving a profit of Z = 3(2) + 
5(6) = $36 (thousand).
In using linear programming, errors in information can result in inef­
ficient utilization of resources (here, production capacity). For example, 
suppose the unit profit margin of $5,000 for product 2 is wrong be­
cause of an accounting error and should be $1,000. Then Z = 3x1 + 
1x2, and from figure 6 the optimal solution becomes x1 = 4 and x2= 3, 
giving a profit Z = 3(4) + 1(3) = $15 (thousand). If, however, the ori­
ginal solution x1 = 2, x2 = 6 is used— it will be used if unknowingly the 
accounting error exists in the unit profit margin for product 2— the profit 
Z = 3x1 + 1x2 = 3(2) + 1(6) = $12 (thousand) (see figure 6). This is 
less than the $15,000 profit that a correct unit-profit-margin figure for 
product 2 would yield.
Thus, errors in information upon which linear programming de­
pends can result in inefficient utilization of resources. This has been 
illustrated graphically in figure 6 for two decision variables x1 and x2.
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When there are more than two variables, methods known technically as 
sensitivity analysis and parametric programming allow us to study the 
effect on optimal solutions of informational errors.14 The cost of such 
informational errors should be balanced against the cost of auditing 
which can reduce such errors.
A particular form of mathematical programming— goal program­
ming15— has been used to model the achievement of social goals as 
well as economic ones.16 The effect of information errors on goal pro­
gramming may be studied via sensitivity analysis, parametric goal pro­
gramming, and goal programming under uncertainty.17 The cost of 
informational errors can be balanced against the cost of auditing to 
produce more reliable information for allocation of resources, not only 
for achievement of economic goals but also for achievement of social 
ones.
Auditing and Decision Theory
It is also of interest to apply cost-benefit analysis at the level of the 
individual auditing firm which must decide how much auditing to do. 
Classical statistical sampling techniques offer formal methods for 
choosing the audit sample size and estimating financial statement 
amounts. Since these techniques are reasonably well known, we do 
not review them here.18 However, recently more comprehensive cost- 
benefit approaches— based on so-called decision theory and Bayesian 
methods— have been suggested.19 The approach described in Scott 
(1973) will serve to illustrate these techniques.
For substantive tests of amounts on financial statements, Scott 
(1973) suggests that the auditor specify his expected probabilities of 
such amounts before audit sampling. The auditor’s prior probabilities 
are directly affected by his evaluation of internal control.20 Then an 
audit sample is taken. Scott shows how to statistically combine the 
prior probabilities with the information obtained from sampling to calcu­
late probabilities of financial statement amounts after auditing (known 
technically as posterior probabilities).
14. Hillier and Lieberman, 1967, 1974; Wagner, 1975; Itami, 1974; Flavell and Salkin, 
1975.
15. Ijiri, 1965, and Lee 1972.
16. Charnes, Colantoni, et al., 1972; Schinnar and Cooper, 1975; and Charnes, Cooper, 
and Kozmetksy, 1973.
17. Lee, 1972, chap. 7.
18. For example, see Stettler, 1974, chap. 28, and Elliott and Rogers, 1972.
19. See Corliss, 1972; Chesley, 1975; Felix, 1974; Kinney, 1974; Loebbecke, 1974; Scott, 
1973; Sorensen, 1969. For a general theory of evidence in auditing, see Toba, 1975.
20. For some recent quantitative approaches to internal control, see Cushing, 1974; Ish­
ikawa, 1975; Smith, 1972; and Yu and Neter, 1973.
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Since current financial statement practice reports a single figure for 
each amount, Scott shows how to obtain this number (known tech­
nically as a point estimate) using the posterior probabilities so as to 
minimize a user’s expected loss. A user’s loss is the loss suffered 
when a decision is based on erroneous financial information and is in­
herent in the auditor’s concept of materiality. This loss is illustrated by 
the curve for the cost of information errors as previously discussed in 
figure 1. In general, the loss curve of various users may be different; 
the auditor himself has his own loss function. Thus, there is a basic 
need to know the decision model of users (for example, the capital 
budgeting and portfolio models discussed above).
So much for the use of the audit sample information once the sam­
ple is taken; but, how large should the sample be in the first place? 
Scott’s approach also allows the auditor in substantive tests to op­
timally choose the sample size so as to minimize a total expected loss 
consisting of the cost of auditing plus the user’s expected loss in de­
ciding with erroneous information.21 This total cost is illustrated by the 
curve for the total cost of information errors and auditing in figure 1. For 
a numerical example of the decision theory approach, the interested 
reader is referred to Felix (1974).
Theoretically, what may be needed is a decision theory analysis 
combining compliance tests of internal control and substantive tests of 
financial statement amounts. A model describing the sequence of audit 
steps and decisions undertaken by the auditor— a decision process 
model of auditing— could provide the structure needed to undertake 
such a decision theory analysis.22 One could attempt to determine how 
much auditing is needed on the basis of materiality (user losses) and 
allocate this between compliance and substantive tests.
Game Theory Approaches to 
Auditing
As noted above, the loss curve for various users may be different. 
Further, in general the loss suffered by a user will depend on the deci­
sion choices of others as well as his own. Such considerations lead us 
into the realm of game theory which is concerned with decision situa­
21. Technically, this is an expected loss as seen before the sample is taken and as­
suming optimal use of the actual sample information once obtained. This 
mathematical procedure of optimally choosing the audit sample size is known as 
preposterior analysis; see Scott, 1973.
22. A decision process model of auditing is generally outlined by Felix, 1974, and 
Loebbecke, 1974.
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tions involving conflict and cooperation among two or more decision 
makers (players).23
Under a game theory approach to auditing, we would try to con­
sider explicitly in relation to one another the preferences and decision 
choices of at least two of the various interested parties (e.g., manage­
ment executives, board of directors, present investors (debt or equity), 
potential investors, creditors, regulators, employees, suppliers, custom­
ers, researchers, "society,” and the auditor).
A simple example will serve to illustrate the game theory approach. 
We consider a two-player game. Player I, the auditor, chooses either a 
modest size audit or an extensive audit. Player II, the firm, selects an 
accounting information system which may be of minimal or good 
quality. Thus, as shown in table 4, player I, the auditor, has two strat­
egies shown as rows— strategy 1, to undertake a modest audit, and 
strategy 2, to do an extensive one. The strategies 1 and 2 of the firm, 
player II, are shown in columns.
Table 4: Game theory approach to auditing
The Firm (Player II)
Strategy 1 
Minimal Quality 
Accounting System
Strategy 2 
Good Quality 
Accounting System
Strategy 1 
(Modest Audit)
- 2 0 , - 1 0  (-3 0 ) 7 -7 (0 )
Strategy 2 
(Extensive Audit)
3, - 6  ( -  3) - 1 , - 8  ( -9 )
Column Minimum -1 0 - 8
Table 4 shows the respective payoffs to each player corresponding 
to selected row/column strategy combinations. For example, if man­
agement chooses a good quality accounting system (its strategy 2) 
and the auditor does a modest audit (his strategy 1), the auditor re­
ceives a $7,000 net fee from the firm and the payoffs are shown as 
(7,-7). If with a good quality accounting system the auditor does an 
extensive audit, the auditor loses $1,000 and the firm now pays $8,000 
(for example, assume the extra audit work costs the auditor $9,000, of 
which the client will only pay $1,000). Thus the payoffs ( -1 ,-8 )  are 
shown in this case. If the firm chooses a minimal quality accounting
23. For an overview and bibliography of game theory, see Lucas, 1972.
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system and the auditor undertakes an extensive audit, the payoffs are 
shown as (3,-6). This could occur, for example, if the extensive audit 
costs the auditor $9,000 more than the modest one, but the client can 
only be billed an additional $5,000. Thus the net payoff to the auditor 
will be $3,000 (7,000 -  9,000 + 5,000 = 3,000). The firm will now be 
paying $7,000 + $5,000 = $12,000 in auditing fees. However, suppose 
the minimal accounting system is $6,000 cheaper. Then the net cost to 
the firm is 12,000 -  6,000 = $6,000—hence the payoff entries (3,-6). 
Finally, if the firm chooses a minimal quality accounting system and the 
auditor does a modest audit, the payoffs are shown as (-20 ,-10 ), rep­
resenting possible lawsuits against the auditor and the firm, as well as 
potential losses due to the use of erroneous accounting information in 
decision making by the firm.
In analyzing the game, we note that payoff combinations (7 ,-7 ) 
and (3 ,-6 ) are equilibrium points—have a stability about them—in the 
sense that there is no incentive for either player to unilaterally shift his 
strategy through these points. Thus, considering payoffs (7,-7), if 
player II is using his strategy 2, there is no incentive for player I to shift 
his strategy from 1 to 2, because if he does, his payoff will drop from 7 
to -1 . Similarly, considering payoffs (7 ,-7), if player I is using his strat­
egy 1, there is no incentive for player II to shift his strategy from 2 to 1 
or his payoff would drop from - 7  to -10 . In the same way (3 ,-6 ) is an 
equilibrium point. Thus (7 ,-7 ) and (3 ,-6 ) could represent stable solu­
tions to the game.
On the other hand, if both players are very conservative, the so- 
called maxmin payoffs ( -1 ,-8 )  could occur. This would result if each 
player tried to maximize his minimum payoff. Referring to table 4, the 
minimum payoff to player I, if he chooses his first row, is -2 0 . Sim­
ilarly, the minimum payoff to player I, if he chooses his second row, is 
-1 . Therefore, by choosing row 2, player I maximizes his minimum 
payoff. Similarly, player II maximizes his minimum payoff by choosing 
column 2. The resulting payoffs ( -1 ,-8 )  are the maxmin payoffs.
If we add the payoff pairs in table 4, we obtain the numbers in 
parentheses. The largest sum—here, zero— indicates the so-called joint 
maximum solution, namely (7 ,-7). Thus (7 ,-7 ) both gives the highest 
total payoff and is also an equilibrium point—a good candidate for a 
solution to the game. However, player II could ask that the audit fee 
corresponding to row 1, column 2, be changed to 5 instead of 7, 
arguing that the new payoff (5 ,-5 )—replacing (7 ,-7 )—is justified on 
the grounds that (5 ,-5 ) is better for the auditor than (3 ,-6), and 
claiming the $2,000 reduction in audit fee as an incentive for the firm to 
go to a good quality accounting system.
Although game theory approaches to auditing appear to have 
promise, considerable research is needed. Some recent efforts in this 
direction may be cited: (1) Demski and Swieringa (1974) consider
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decision choices and preferences of the auditor and auditee, who 
cooperatively formulate an audit approach; (2) Hamilton (1975) consid­
ers auditor, manager, and owner in a three-player auditing game 
formulation; (3) Fromovitz and Loeb (1975) formulate audit report deci­
sions as a zero-sum game between auditor and society with society 
controlling the expected cost of a lawsuit.
In general, a cooperative game analysis of auditing would appear 
to have promise. However, as stated, considerable further research is 
required.
Summary and Concluding Remarks
In this study we have attempted to delineate various approaches to 
measuring and balancing the costs and benefits of auditing at the level 
of the firm and in the economy as a whole. Several promising ap­
proaches have been described. At the level of the economy as a 
whole, capital budgeting and portfolio theory have been used to dis­
cuss the contribution of auditing to economic output. In principle, the 
loss in overall economic output due to information errors can be bal­
anced against the cost of auditing which serves to reduce information 
errors. While additional detailed work is needed, the model as pre­
sented develops the basic theoretical reasoning for balancing the 
costs and benefits of auditing at the level of the economy as a whole. 
At the level of the firm, linear programming— a widely used technique 
for resource allocation decisions— has been used to study the cost of 
information errors in the utilization of resources. The cost of such infor­
mation errors should be balanced against the cost of auditing which 
can reduce such errors. With respect to the individual auditing firm that 
must decide how much auditing to do, we have discussed the use of 
so-called decision theory methods to balance the cost of auditing 
against a user’s expected loss in deciding with erroneous information. 
The problem of multiple users with different loss curves leads naturally 
to consideration of the possibilities for game theory approaches to au­
diting. These are brought out through an auditing game in which the 
auditor and the firm are the players. Finally, the results of a study relat­
ing auditing fees to various company characteristics are presented 
(see Appendix).
In all, the area of cost-benefit analysis in auditing holds considera­
ble promise and merits extensive further research. Hopefully, this study 
provides a base from which such work may proceed.
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APPENDIX
Factors Affecting 
Audit Fees
Robert K. Elliott, partner, 
and Alan R. Korpi, manager, 
Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co.*
A number of studies of audit fees have been made, but these studies have 
generally omitted many variables relevant to audit fee determination. The 
results have generally shown very simple relationships, such as audit fees as a 
percentage of sales.
The audit fee required for a given company is a complex function of many 
company-specific variables. To attempt to determine which are the most signif­
icant variables affecting audit fees, and what the functional relationship is, we 
undertook an empirical study of audit fees for our firm’s clients.
Study Method
We identified a number of variables that could reasonably be expected to 
affect audit fees. These variables included the following:
Size (revenue, income, assets, equity)
Industry (manufacturing, financial, etc.)
Complexity (reliance on internal auditors, quality of internal control, 
physical complexity, legal complexity, reporting complexity, degree of 
automation of accounting records, degree of centralization of account­
ing and financial control, public/private company)
This selection of variables is not the only set possible for analysis; other 
variables could have been included.
To collect this data, we designed a questionnaire (see exhibit B for question­
naire and factors for translating qualitative data to quantitative form). A strat­
ified random sample was drawn from the firm’s 1975 audit client file as follows:
•  100 clients with audit fees from $2,000 to $49,999 (audit fees less 
than $2,000 were deemed to be for accounting services other than 
auditing)
*Used with permission of the authors.
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•  100 clients with audit fees from $50,000 to $249,999
•  All clients with audit fees of $250,000 and up
The questionnaire was sent to the audit engagement partners for these clients. 
The sample did not include the separate engagements of subsidiaries, affili­
ates, or divisions of a corporate entity. To prevent duplication of clients, the 
engagement partner of a top corporate reporting entity was asked to respond 
for the entire audit of that corporation. We received 196 usable responses. 
Because we regard the actual audit fees of the firm’s clients to be proprietary 
information, we multiplied all audit fees in the sample by a constant (a random 
number selected from the range .80 to 1.25). This had the effect of preserving 
all the essential relationships for this study, but protecting the confidentiality of 
our fee structure.
Several cautions should be observed in interpreting the results because of 
possible subjectivity in the data collected.
•  The respondents were required to make subjective judgments to 
determine responses for some of the questions.
•  The respondents were required to select the best answer to a series 
of questions when the correct answer may not have been provided 
as a selection choice on the questionnaire.
•  The respondents may have made different judgments when faced  
with the same set of circumstances.
These limitations and others reduce the reliability of the data and conclusions 
to a certain extent.
Using the adjusted fee data and the other information elicited by the question­
naire, we used multiple regression techniques to analyze the significant rela­
tionships in the data.
To facilitate the identification of key variables, we separated the financial data 
into five subsets:
•  The entire file of 196 clients.
•  A file of 129 large clients (those with audit fees over $50,000).
•  A file of the remaining sixty-seven small clients.
•  A file of sixty manufacturing clients.
•  A file of forty-two financial clients (banks, insurance companies, 
etc.).
As a result of analyzing these five files, we determined that the most significant 
variables affecting audit fees were the following:
•  A size variable (sales or assets depending upon the dominant na­
ture of the client’s business).
•  The degree of complexity in locations and product lines (which 
affects the number of audit teams and the need for specialized 
skills).
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•  The degree of accounting and financial centralization (which affects 
the number of audit teams involved in an audit).
•  The percentage reduction of audit scope because of reliance on 
internal auditors.
•  The number of additional reports required (which affected the num­
ber of full-scope audits required).
•  The percentage realization of standard audit fees (i.e., the ratio of 
actual to standard fees).
Although the other data collected in our study were also correlated to audit 
fees, their effects were largely captured by the factors mentioned above, so it 
was not necessary to include them separately in the models developed. For 
example, the quality of internal control was largely captured by the degree of 
reliance on internal auditors and the legal complexity variable was largely 
captured in the number-of-separate-reports variable.
Other factors may affect the audit fee, but they were not covered in the survey 
questionnaire, and they may not be easy to quantify. They include the ca­
pabilities and experience of the auditors, the time of year in which the work 
was completed, and the urgency of completing the work. This is especially true 
for the sample file of small clients, for which a reliable regression equation 
could not be obtained. A greater number of factors evidently affect the audit 
fees of these small clients.
The most successful audit fee model was for the manufacturing companies.The 
model developed was as follows:
Expected 
audit fee
fee real­
ization 
fraction
1-
 audit re­
duction   
fraction 
based on 
reliance 
on inter­
nal
auditors
12,700
number 
of audit
reports in +4.777 salesxcomplexity 
excess of 
one
where the complexity variable ranges from 1 for a centralized, one-product, 
one-location company to 10 for a decentralized, multiproduct, multinational 
company.
Note the square root sign over the sales and complexity variables. This means 
that, other things being equal, fees do not rise as quickly as sales or complex­
ity. For example, if two companies are otherwise similar but one is four times 
as large (measured by sales), its audit fee will only be twice as large ( 4  = 
2).
The above model can be illustrated as follows: Suppose a manufacturing client 
with the following characteristics:
•  Fee realization is 95 percent of standard.
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•  Due to reliance on internal auditors, the audit scope can be reduced 
by 20 percent.
•  Five separate audit reports are required.
•  Sales equal $2 billion.
•  The company is a decentralized, multiproduct, multinational com­
pany.
The expected fee would be
(.95)(1 -  .20)[12,7 00 (5 -1)+4.777 2,000,000,000x10]
= $552,000.
Obviously, the actual fee would differ from $552,000 based on specific factors 
not included in the model. This model only explains 94.3 percent of audit fee 
variance.*
For financial companies (e.g., banks and insurance companies), assets were a 
more reliable indicator than sales, and the resulting model was as follows:
Expected = 
audit fee ~
fee real­
ization 
fraction
audit re­
duction  
fraction 
based on 
reliance 
on inter­
nal
 auditors  
1- 6,600
 number  
of audit 
reports in 
excess of 
one
+3.474  assets x complexity
This model explained 84.8 percent of audit fee variance for financial com­
panies.
For the additional models (for the large companies versus small companies 
and the entire sample of companies) see exhibit A (which also includes 
statistical significance data). These models are in identical form to those 
presented above.
On the basis of the best regression formula, one can calculate the expected 
audit fee for each client and compare it to the actual fee. An outlier is a case 
(client) for which the actual value has a large percentage deviation from the 
value predicted by the regression equation. All five sample files had outliers, 
but the financial group had a higher incidence of outliers. Although the regres­
sion variables are highly significant in this model, additional factors are also 
significant.
Many of the outliers in the overall model were financial institutions or public 
utilities, where the actual audit fee was below the expected fee. The uniformity 
of operations of these clients may lead to more efficient auditing. Public utilities 
have productive assets which require minimal auditing in years after construc­
tion or acquisition.
*That is, the adjusted index of determination (R2) is .943.
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Although the models developed do not fully explain the amount of audit fees, 
they present consistent, logical relationships. The selected independent varia­
bles are highly significant and permit a reasonably good fit considering the 
multitude of elements which can affect the audit fee. The models successfully 
identify the most critical factors, but do not present an accurate formula for use 
by accounting firms in developing fee proposals. Fee proposals still require a 
comprehensive review of the particular characteristics of a potential client.
Technical Discussion
The models tested were hypothesized based on our expectations of how the 
independent variables would be related to audit fees. Within this class of 
models, we identified the specific models that attained the best fit as evi­
denced by the following:
•  The highest possible adjusted index of determination, which meas­
ures the extent to which the independent variables account for the 
variance in the dependent variable.
•  A reasonable value and sign for the coefficients of each independ­
ent variable.
•  The highest possible T values for the independent variables (which 
indicate the significance of the coefficients of each variable in the 
equation; a T value over 2 is significant for a sample size of thirty or 
more observations).
•  The lowest possible correlation between the independent variables. 
This helps to insure that the impact of each independent variable 
can be separately measured by regression analysis. (Sales and 
assets were not used in the same regression model as independent 
variables because they have a high correlation and the resulting 
regression coefficients may be unreliable. We could not easily dif­
ferentiate the separate effects of assets and sales on audit fees.)
•  The lowest possible standard error of the estimate, which measures 
the expected range about the estimated regression plane.
Each model was processed with (a) an intercept determined from the data and 
(b) an assumed intercept of zero. A positive intercept would indicate that there 
is a basic cost of an audit before the size, complexity, and reports variables 
are introduced. A zero intercept would indicate that there is no basic cost of 
an audit. In all cases the intercept value determined from the data was not 
significant, therefore, we specified zero intercepts.
For the regression estimates to be considered unbiased, efficient, and consis­
tent, four assumptions must be satisfied: normality of the residual values 
between actual and estimate, absence of multicollinearity among independent 
variables, absence of heteroscedasticity (a condition under which the points 
are not uniformly scattered about the regression line), and absence of autocor­
relation of residuals. The residuals are not quite normal due to the effect of 
small clients in the sample; the difference is not significant and is tolerable. 
The multicollinearity between the two independent variables is statistically 
insignificant. There is some heteroscedasticity about the assets variable due to
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the effect of small clients. There is no significant heteroscedasticity about the 
reports variable. Autocorrelation is not a problem since the model involves 
cross-sectional, rather than time-series, data. On balance the assumptions are 
satisfied. The ordinary least squares regression coefficients and standard error 
of the estimate are efficient, consistent, unbiased estimators of the true popula­
tion values.
1st independent 
variable
Name A A B B A
Coefficient 4.524 4.518 2.657 4.777 3.474
T Value 17.9 14.6 12.3 14.4 9.2
2nd independent 
variable
Name C C C C C
Coefficient 11,429 11,535 1,911 12,728 6,636
T Value 12.5 10.2 3.7 11.0 2.8
Adjusted index 
of determina­
tion .886 .887 .742 .943 .848
Correlation of 
independent
variables .70 .70 .22 .68 .68
Standard error
of the estimate 60.6% 49.8% 63.7% 37.5% 63.2%
Note: The Y-intercept of these equations is zero.
A =  assets x complexity 
B =  sales x complexity
Complexity = physical complexity x accounting centralization 
C = number of reports minus one
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Exhibit A
Multiple Regression Characteristics for Each File
File Entire Large Small
Manufac­
turing
Finan­
cial
Exhibit B
Audit Fee 
Questionnaire
(Parenthetical numbers represent weightings 
assigned for regression analysis.)
Note: This questionnaire is to be com pleted only for the top corporate 
reporting entity. If the selected engagem ent is a subsidiary (of either a 
PMM client or otherwise), affiliate, or otherwise does not result in a top 
corporate level audit opinion, so note and return the uncom pleted 
questionnaire.
1. Client name:__________________________________________
2. Audit fee for last audit completed: standard $____________
actual $____________
for fiscal year ended ____________
Note: Audit fee should include all audit fees, foreign and domestic, 
for the company and all subsidiaries. It should exclude manage­
ment consulting, tax, and special work not related to the audit 
opinion. It should include annual (recurring) fees related to re­
quired filings such as 10-K’s and S-8’s, but exclude fees related 
solely to initial registrations, such as S-1’s. The audit fee (standard 
and/or actual) may be an estimate within plus or minus 5%; in such 
case, please write “estimated” after the estimated standard and/or 
actual fees above.
3. Is the client publicly held? _Yes _ No
Registered with the SEC? _Yes _ No
Note: Use common definitions. If in doubt, describe facts.
4. What is the client’s predominant business?
_ Manufacturing _ Financial
_ Merchandising _ Not for profit
_ Other (explain__________________________________________ )
5. Consolidated financial information for latest fiscal year audited.
Sales or revenue: $ ___________________________
Income before extraordinary 
items and cumulative 
effect of accounting
changes $ ___________________________
Net income $ ___________________________
Total assets $ ___________________________
Equity $ ___________________________
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6. Internal audit. To what extent is the audit fee reduced because of 
participation of internal auditors (estimate)?
(.60)_ More than 50% (.05) _  Some, but less than 10%
(.20) _  10% to 30%
7. Internal control. Overall, what is the quality of internal controls for 
the entire entity (including subsidiaries)? Note that internal control 
includes the level of expertise of financial accounting personnel.
(3) _  Fair
8. Physical complexity. Overall, how complex is the physical situation 
of the entity as measured by the number and location of operating 
units and the diversification of product lines? A "very simple” entity 
would have a single domestic place of business and a single 
product line. A “very complex” entity would have numerous loca­
tions for plants, offices, branches, salesrooms, etc., foreign and 
domestic, and numerous product lines.
(1 )  Very simple (4 )_ Fairly complex
(2 )   Fairly simple (5) __ Very complex
(3 )   Moderate
9. Legal complexity. Overall, how complex is the legal structure of the 
entity as measured by the number and jurisdictions of operating 
legal entities? A "very simple” entity would have a single, domestic 
legal operating entity. A “very complex” entity would have numer­
ous operating legal entities (subsidiaries and affiliates), in numer­
ous states and foreign countries.
(1) _  Very simple (4) _  Fairly complex
(2 )  Fairly simple (5 )_Very complex
(3 )   Moderate
10. Reporting complexity. How many separate audit reports are issued 
annually for this entity? Consider reports containing a standard 
auditor’s opinion, such as combining financial statements and sep­
arate reports on subsidiaries and affiliates. Do not count reis­
suances (such as 10-K’s) nor special reports (e.g., debt 
compliance letters).
Number of reports_____
11. How would you characterize the extent of automation of accounting 
records?
(1) _  Not automated (3) _  Highly automated
(2 )   Partially automated
(.40) _  30% to 50% (0.0)_ None
(1) _  Excellent
(2) _  Good
(4 )   Poor
(5 )  Virtually none
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12. What is the degree of centralization of accounting and financial 
control?
(1 )_ Centralized (2)_ Decentralized
13. Please note any unique factors (not covered above) you believe 
would substantially affect the comparability of audit fees for this 
client with fees for other clients.
Audit Engagement Partner
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